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The Relationship between the Announcements of  
CEO Changes and Stock Prices 
 
By Jiaqi LI 
 
This paper utilized an event-study in order to investigate the effect of the 
announcement of CEO turnover and the stock prices. In this paper, using 100 
corporate firms are listed in the NASDAQ and New York Stock Exchange are separated 
them into 2 groups under Global Industry Classification Standard. By analyzing the 
abnormal returns, average abnormal returns, and cumulative abnormal returns, we 
tried to establish the implication in the semi-strong form market efficient hypothesis 
(EMH).  
 
The results of t-test shows that abnormal returns, average abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns are not significantly difference from zero, which means 
that the announcement of CEO changes have no impact on stock price. Furthermore, 
it indicates that investors cannot obtain excess returns over a period under the EMH, 
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The effect of management changes on stock prices has been investigated for several 
decades. As a decision-maker, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are able to change 
their firm’s destiny because they are in a position to make vital decisions. Reuters 
reported, for example, the Chief Executive Officer of Duke Energy, Jim Rogers, was 
dismissed from the top job at the company ( July 3, 2012). This announcement caused 
a drop in their stock price by 1.6 percent. In addition, the CEO’s background, 
preferences, skills, and strategies affect the performance of the firm’s stock. They 
believe is that a corporate executive’s background, ability, and experience are highly 
correlated with the performance of a firm. For instance, according to Associated Press, 
in order to regain shareholder trust, Wal-Mart hired former KPMG executive, Tim 
Flynn, after the Mexican scandal (July 30, 2012). Wal-Mart shares increased 46 cents 
after this step.  
 
1.2 Purpose of Study 
It is essential to figure out the relationship between CEO turnover and stock prices.  
CEO turnover occurs when a manager retires, resigns, dies, or is fired. 
Announcements of changes in CEOs are shown in foot notes, rather than financial 
statements. It means that this kind of information, to some extent, does not influence 
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the balance sheet, income statement or cash flow statements. However, CEO turnover 
conveys a signal to the stock market, leading to fluctuations in stock prices. Secondly, 
whether or not this major event affects stock prices depends on the type of event. 
Investors believe that a capable and experienced CEO brings a huge amount of 
benefits to the firm. 
 
1.3 Need for Study 
The news about a firm’s corporate events is the guideline for investors, before 
investing. Investors believe that the announcements of a CEO turnover have negative 
impact on the equity. One reason is that good performing of one firm will not 
announce this kind of news, unless the firm is in trouble. Take Computer Sciences 
Corp. as an example. Mike Lawrie has been hired as a new CEO, who is expected to 
cover the net loss of $158 million in the last quarter. However, this decision did not 
appeal to its investors in the short-term. The stock price still went down dramatically.  
 
1.4 Statement of Problem 
This paper will focus on the relationship between CEO changes and stock prices. 
Usually, there are three major reasons why CEOs’ leave their positions: First, health 
problems. Some of them are too old to complete their jobs so that retirement is 
appropriate for them. Second, CEOs are fired by the board of the firms due to 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Third, compensation to CEOs has been a critical 





1.5 Organization of paper 
This paper is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1 is the general introduction about 
the relationship between announcements of CEO changes and the stock prices. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on this subject, which significantly focusses on the 
impact of CEO turnover on firms’ performance and stock market. Chapter 3 explains 
the models and methodology, which are considered on this area, including sources of 
data collection and model selection. Chapter 4 is the analysis of results, containing 
statistical analysis of the model estimation and the implication for market efficiency. 








Generally, there are five internal events affecting stock prices: mergers and 
acquisitions, financial reports, dividend policy changes announcements, the 
development or approval of a new innovative product, and the hiring or firing of 
company executives. Changing a top-management, for example, Chief Executive 
Officer, will brings unexpected change on the performance of stock prices. Past 
studies can be categorized into five main parts: 1) impact on ex-ante day, 2) impact on 
announcement day, 3) impact on ex-post day, 4) signaling, and 5) shareholders’ 
reaction. 
 
2.1 Impact on ex-ante day 
In this field of study, scholars focus on both the CEO change announcements and 
stock prices by studying cumulative abnormal returns over a period. Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) refers to cumulative the daily excess security returns over 
the market returns for a given time period. 
 
Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers and Owers (1989) used 1,187 CEO successions from 1971 
to 1985, and found that investors’ revising their expectations drive down a firm's stock 
price by an average of 1 percent during the pre-announcement period and an 
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additional 3.5 percent during the 50-day post-announcement period.  
 
2.2 Impact on announcement day 
Corporate news regarding a departure of the managers or an appointment of the new 
one are announced simultaneously, so it causes positive or negative price effects for 
these changes surrounding the announcement day. Furtado and Karan (1990) pointed 
out that there is negative correlation between CEO turnover and stock prices. Also 
their event studies showed that over 30% of all CEOs turnovers were announced at 
the same time with release of earnings report and other important economic news that 
influence share prices. 
 
The following study illustrates two effects associated with the announcement of 
management changes by Bonnier and Bruner (1989). Based on Warner et al. (1988) 
and Jensen and Warner (1988) studies, the first one effect is from informational 
perspective, which could be negative if the change suggests that the firm’s 
performance was worse than the market had realized. The other one is real effect, 
which would be positive if the change is in shareholders’ interest. After eliminating 
the dividend issues from their sample data, Bonnier and Bruner got the significantly 
positive results from the data set. Changing CEOs is associated with2.4 percent higher 





Warner, Watfs, and Wruck (1988) tested 269 NYSE and AMEX firms in the period 
1963-1978 for shares performance and top management changes. The performances 
of daily abnormal returns (90 trading days) appear unimpressive response to the 
changes. However, the performance of monthly abnormal returns cannot prove that 
market reaction directly linked to the announcement of a management change. 
 
Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman (1985) analyzed much more specific area 
of executive changes (i.e. sudden executive deaths). They used the sample of 53 
sudden deaths of senior corporate executives (i.e. chairman of the board, chief 
executive officer, or president) which occurred between January 1, 1971 and 
December 31, 1982.The empirical results showed that normal excess returns are not 
statistically different from zero, and then they added the dispersion of standardized 
excess returns for the announcement period. Finally, the outcomes support the idea 
about relation between share price adjustments and the unexpected deaths of senior 
corporate executives. 
 
2.3 Impact on ex-post day 
After the event, there are few investors and scholars paying attention to the 
post-announcement. According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) theory, the 
stock market react the changes rationally and promptly. As Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers 
and Owers said, the excess returns of post-announcement of CEO changes perform 
weaker than those surrounding the pre-announcement and announcement day. They 
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separated five time horizons to test cumulatively excess daily returns, the first two 
periods have been discussed in the previous part. From the third horizon and the 
fourth horizon, they found a positive and significant correlation between the 
characteristics of the manager and abnormal returns, separately. But in the fifth 
horizon, the performance was weak. 
 
2.5 Signaling 
Replacing a top manager of a firm sends a message to the public. This replacement of 
the “special human capital” [Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman, (1985)] 
signals about a company’s current outstanding performance and its future prospects. 
They predicted that the unexpected death of an executive with significant share 
ownership may signal an increase in the probability of a takeover, and thus may give 
rise to a positive share price adjustment. Nevertheless, the evidence showed that these 
firms experienced a modest negative stock price reaction to the executive's death. 
 
Furtado and Karan (1990) indicate that two actions seem to occur after management 
turnover. The first one is that firms may take "earnings baths" in an improved 
performance. That means the executives’ skills are approved in the earning reports 
through operations of their firms. The other one is that the connection between firms’ 
response to the uncertainty environment and its characteristics to find a new top 
manager. If the top-manager cannot catch up with the changing world, he or she has to 
be fired sooner or later. However, the empirical results tell different stories. They 
8 
 
found significantly positive abnormal returns were caused by outsider changes instead 
of CEO (insider) changes. Similarly, Borstadt (1985) and Mahajan and Lummer (1993) 
also found no significant effects of CEOs changes from their tests.  
 
In 1989, Bonnier and Bruner studied the relationship between the stock price and the 
CEOs turnover in distressed firm by employing cross-section hypothesis. They 
introduced 3 factors to explain this hypothesis, and origin of the successor is one of 
them. The null hypothesis is that the appointment of an outsider brings negative effect 
on stock performance. One reason is that investors were signaled the companies need 
to employ a more qualified manager from the outside world.  
 
2.6 Shareholders’ reaction 
Shareholders’ wealth is tight to firm’s value. Each movement of the firms draws 
attention to shareholders. In general, changing CEOs sends a poor signal to the market 
that this firm’s business cycle is declining. However, some researches on this issue 
exposed divergent conclusions.  
 
Unexpected managers’ deaths were reflected in a positive share reaction, if the 
shareholders can get more favorable wealth, said by Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and 
Newman in 1985. Otherwise, they were reflected in a negative outcome. They 
considered two situations: discontinued employment and incumbent employment. 
Even though they assumed the first employment brings adverse shareholders wealth 
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effect and the later one leads to positive consequence, they concluded that it is too 
complicated to explain the contradictory outcomes. 
 
“Shareholder wealth effect of management changes” was published by Mahajan and 
Lummer (1993). They used 498 announcements of management changes from the 
common equity firms during 1972 to 1983 periods. They separated all manage 
changes into two groups based on the instigated sources: internally and externally. So 
they can figure out the stock price reaction to manage changes whether from 
internally or externally instigated. After testing three hypotheses in these two groups, 
the outcomes indicate variance abnormal returns. There were negative abnormal 
returns when the changes were internally instigated by the corporate power. No 
abnormal returns were observed when the CEOs chose voluntary departure. 
Significantly positive abnormal returns were correlated with the unexpected deaths, 
which support the view of Johnson, Magee, Magarajan, and Newman (1985). 
 
Summary 
Firstly, most of the authors assume that there are negative returns between the 
announcement of CEO changes and stock prices, whereas the statistical results are 
various. Secondly, some studies indicate negative outcomes and others show positive. 
One reason is that they focus on different sides of this event. Furthermore, each single 
side change at one place in a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large 
differences to a later state, known as “the butterfly effect”. Thirdly, a diverse market 
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in various countries has a different data set. Different market timing (i.e. 
announcement date, effective date) and uncertainty factors (such as government policy, 
natural disasters, and personal factor, etc.) lead to diverse conclusions. Fourthly, there 
is no evidence indicating that the CEO turnovers affect the stock market, but it is 
undeniable that this announcement can convey some messages to the market 
regarding the firm’s operations and situation. 
 
Overall, each research focuses on specific factors with relative function, even though 
the macro view of this research is similar. For example, Bonnier and Bruner (1989) 
concentrated on stock prices reaction in distressed firms, but John et al. (1985) 
analyzed the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths. What is more, Beatty 
and Zajac (1987) wrote about CEO change and firm performance in large corporation, 
which is similar to the topic of Watts et al. (1987).  
 
Furthermore, the data from most of the previous research is from CRSP (the Center 
for Research in Security Prices), and authors frequently collect the relevant 
announcement date of the events from the Wall Street Journal. Although this paper is 
not going to use the same data sources from CRSP, these points of view from previous 
studies will be applied in the later chapters. Chapter 3 will explore the models and 






This paper predicts that the termination of the management relationship influences 
shareholder wealth under the assumption that the United States stock market is 
efficient, and supports the efficient market hypothesis. Market efficiency is described 
as follows: first, stock prices adjust quickly to reflect new information (such as 
announcement of CEO changes); second, stock prices adjust accurately to reflect new 
information; third, market reaction to new information can be tested by using the 
CAR(Cumulative Abnormal Return). 
 
Furthermore, this paper examines the impact of CEO turnover by using event-study 
methodology. There are 3 segments included in the sample space, 1) pre-event 
period, assumed to be immune to the event; 2) event-date (period t=0), on which the 
event occurred; 3) post-event period (the information period),which reflects the 
impact of the event occurred. 
 
The following are the assumptions of event study. First of all, the stock market is 
assumed to be semi-strong efficient based on the EMH theory that all public 
information has been reflected into a stock's current share price. Secondly, no 
material information is available in advance. Otherwise, investors with inside 
information can take advantage of them, and earn abnormal returns. Thirdly, there is 
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only one event happening during announcement period. Based on the assumptions 
above, it can be summarized that abnormal returns react to the announcement 
when abnormal returns are greater than zero. 
 
3.1 Sample selection 
The sample consists of 2 groups, securities listed on National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ), group 1, and on New York Stock 
Exchanges (NYSE) over the period from 2007 to 2012, group 2. 50 firms from the first 
group belong to Information and Technology (IT) under Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS). The second group of 50 companies’ is from Consumer Staples Sector. 
The event data are gathered from the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, regional 
newspaper, and the form 10-K’s filled with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). 
The one and only event of CEO departure from his position at the announcement 
date are selected. 
Table 1-a 
Distributions of the announcements in the IT Sector during 2007~2012 (50 
observations) 
Year Number of 
announcements 
Year Number of 
announcements 
2007 3 2010 9 
2008 6 2011 22 





Distributions of the announcements in the Consumer Staples Sector during 
2007~2012 (50 observations) 
Year Number of 
announcements 
Year Number of 
announcements 
2007 10 2010 6 
2008 6 2011 13 
2009 6 2012 9 
Table 1-a and Table 1-b show the distributions of events by years and by the number 
of announcements over 2007 to 2012.It is obvious that the largest number of 
announcements were appeared on 2011 in these two sectors. 
 
3.2 Time horizons and models 
3.21 Time horizons 
Identifying events and relevant event periods are the first step of the event-study. 
The announcement of CEO changes is the researched event, and its announcement 
date is defined as t=0. Pre-announcement period is from t=-180 to t=0 days. The 
continuing price movements to the new information are observed in the event 
window, the period of50 days before and after the announcement day (t=-50 to 
t=+50). Post-announcement period indicates the investors’ reaction after the event in 











As Figure 1 shows, there are 3 time-horizons in this event study: pre-event, 
post-event and event window. 
 
3.22 Models 
The single-factor model (Fama (1976)) is used to calculate daily abnormal return. The 
event date (day 0) is defined as the day of the CEOs turnover or the first day 
following the event, if the change occurred on a non-trading day. 
 
The market model establishes a linear relationship behavior excess security return 
and excess market returns. 
ri,t = αi + βi ∗ rm,t + εi,t                     (1) 
Where: 
rit  =  Rit − Rit̂, the excess actual security return ( Rit is daily return of each firm at 
time t, Rit̂ is expected return of each firm at time t) 





αi    =The interception of the regression model or constant term 
βi    =The slope of the regression model specific to the firm 
rmt =  Rmt − Rmt̂ , the excess market return (Rmtis daily return of the market at time 
t, Rmt̂  is expected return of the market at time t ) 
εit   = Random error term or residual on firm i at time t 
 











 Ri,t      = Daily return of each firm at time t 
Pi,t+1   = Closed stock price of each firm at time t+1 
Pi,t        = Closed stock price of each firm at time t 
Rm,t     = Daily return of the market at time t 
Pm,t+1 = Closed price of market index at time t+1 
Pm,t     = Closed price of market index at time t 
 
The pre-event data can be employed to estimateαi and βi, and then to forecast the 
returns for the post-event periods. (Assumeαi and βi are constant) 
r̂i,t = αi + βi ∗ rm,t                         (2) 
Where r̂i,t is the expected excess return of each firm at time t. 
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The Abnormal Return (AR) is calculated by subtracting expected return (r̂i,t) from 
actual return (ri,t), 
ARi,t = ri,t − r̂i,t                          (3) 






i=1                          (4) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for the period t, 
CARi,t = CARi,t−1 + ARi,t                     (5) 
 
3.23 Effects 
In order to test whether these outcomes significant or not, this paper applies 
t-statistic to justify the results of AR, AAR and CAR, respectively. 
 
Abnormal Return (AR) 
If the market is efficient and rational, the Abnormal Return (AR) is equal to zero (i.e. 
AR=0). Hence, the null hypothesis 
(H0: the announcement of CEO changes has no effect on the stock price) and 
alternative hypothesis 
(Ha: the announcement of CEO changes has effect on the stock pice) are as follows: 
H0: ARi,t = 0, this event not influence the stock price at time t 









Average Abnormal Return (AAR) 
If AAR is equal to zero, the announcement of CEO turnover cannot influence stock 
prices at all.  
H0: AARi,t = 0, average abnormal return cannot be obtained over period t 
Ha: AARi,t ≠ 0, average abnormal return can be obtained over period t 
T-test:  t=
AAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −0
SAAR
 
WhereSAAR is the standard deviation of AAR. 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
This paper uses CAR model to test 3 time-horizons to obtain the reliable results. 
Cumulative abnormal return can be realized in the long-term, as long as AR is not 
equal to zero. 
H0
1: CARi,t = 0,Cumulative abnormal return cannot be realized during pre-event 
periods. 
Ha
1: CARi,t ≠ 0, Cumulative abnormal return can be realized during pre-event periods. 
H0
2: CARi,t = 0, Cumulative abnormal return cannot be realized during event window. 
Ha
2: CARi,t ≠ 0, Cumulative abnormal return can be realized during event window. 
H0
3: CARi,t = 0,Cumulative abnormal return cannot be realized during post-event 
periods. 
Ha





CAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −0
SCAR
 




Results and Analysis 
100 corporate firms are separated into 2 groups. As mentioned above in chapter 3, 
coefficient αand βcan be estimated by pre-event data. Under the assumption that
αand βare constant over a certain period, they can be used in the post-event data 
(t=-50 to t=0) and event-window (t=-10 to t=10) during 2007~2012. The daily stock 
price returns have been calculated. And then, the abnormal returns are obtained by 
the difference between the actual return and the expected return during a period.  
 
Group 1: IT firms 
The total observations of this group are 9676, and six variables are included (see 






,are employed to calculate the daily return, which is 
based on the previous stock price. The abnormal returns are obtained via calculating 
daily returns and expected returns (see figure 3).The highest abnormal return is 0.01 
while the lowest abnormal return is -0.01. The t-statistic for cumulative abnormal 
return indicates that the average t-value is 0.88, which is greater than t critical value 
of -2 and less than the critical value of 2 at 5% significant level ( see figure 4 ). What 
is more, the p-value is 0.382, which is greater than 0.05 at 95% level. Thus, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, which is no significant difference between 
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abnormal return and zero, as well as the difference between CAR and zero. 
Furthermore, R-squared and adjusted R^2 are equal to zero, which also implies that 
there is no correlation between the announcement of CEO changes and stock prices. 
 
Group 2: Consumer Staples firms 
7571 observations and six variables are included in this group (see figure 5). Daily 
returns are achieved by excess security return and excess market return models (see 
figure 7). The outcomes of the abnormal returns are negative. -0.06 is the highest 
abnormal returns, and -0.08 is the lowest abnormal returns. After using the t-statistic 
for the results, the average value of cumulative abnormal returns is -1.0, which is in 
the middle of the t-critical value of -2 and the critical value of 2 at 5% significant level 
( see figure 8 ). Moreover, the p-value is 0.324, which is similar with that of group 1. 
Thus, we accept the null hypothesis, which is the announcement of CEO changes has 
no effect on the stock price, as well as CARs cannot be realized during a period. 
Furthermore, R-squared and adjusted R^2 are exactly equal to zero, which also 
implies that the announcement of CEO changes cannot influence stock prices. 
 
In summary, these 2 groups depict the similar results regarding the relationship 
between the announcement of CEO changes and the stock prices. Both of them 
prove that the market is efficient and support the semi-strong form of EMH. Because 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, no one can earn excess return based on the 
inside information (i.e. CEO turnover).Compared abnormal return between group 1 
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and group 2 (figure 3 and figure 7), it shows that the abnormal returns of group 1 are 
fluctuated heavily. However, the group 2 stays at the same level during a period. Even 
though there is a significant difference between these 2 groups, t-test finally shows 







Conclusion and Recommendation 
This paper investigates the performance of firms’ stock prices in terms of the 
announcement of CEO turnover in American stock market from 2007 to 2012.50 
firms of each group are collected randomly from NASDAQ and New York Stock 
Exchange. To make an accurate result, the daily returns, instead of monthly or 
quarterly, on the United States’ stock market are used. Through calculating this data, 
the outcomes are supportive to semi-strong form of EMH that stock prices react to 
the momentous information promptly and rationally. No one can earn the abnormal 
return under this situation. 
 
Challenges 
There are some challenges existing when the returns are calculated. Firstly, the errors 
of the employed models may be large, because it is troublesome to find the data 
about the stock price before and after the announcement date. Secondly, 
hetergenousity cannot be avoided. Thirdly, quantifying this kind of announcement of 
CEO changes also brings a lot of trouble, because it causes errors when transferring 
into a data set. Fourthly, the assumption of the coefficient of α and β may be 
wrong, because uncertainty factors can be contained. Fifthly, this paper just 
considers one and only one event occurs surrounding the announcement date. 





The t-statistics of the results indicate that the announcement of CEO changes has no 
impact on the stock prices because abnormal returns are closed to zero. The results 
also prove that the United States’ stock market is an efficient, which support the 
EMH. In other words, investors cannot obtain abnormal returns before or after the 
announcement date.  
 
In order to confirm the accuracy of these outcomes, we can choose different stock 
market, such as London Stock Exchange (Canadian market), Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (Chinese market), Australian Securities Exchange (Australian market), and 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (Japanese market), etc. Besides, the size of the data can be 









Summarize the data of IT firms 
 
  
Sorted by:  
                                                                                                                                             
return          double %10.0g                 daily return based on the daily stock prices
announcement_~e int    %dd_m_CY               announcement dates
year            int    %10.0g                 the year of the announcement
price           double %10.0g                 daily stock prices
date            int    %dd_m_CY               the date of stock prices
company_id      byte   %10.0g                 IT company's ID number
                                                                                                                                             
variable name   type   format      label      variable label
              storage  display     value
                                                                                                                                             
 size:       222,548                          
 vars:             6                          28 Aug 2012 12:52
  obs:         9,676                          
      return        9645    .0660113    5.514981         -1    538.661
                                                                      
announceme~e        9676    18495.42    480.6357      17283      19185
        year        9676    2010.066     1.35876       2007       2012
       price        9676    20.77959    57.35145       .015     636.23
        date        9676     18631.7    478.6154      17156      19193
  company_id        9676    21.76126    12.89471          1         50
                                                                      















                                                                              
       _cons     .0141747    .016063     0.88   0.382    -.0181052    .0464545
                                                                              
cumulative~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .632150669    49  .012901034           Root MSE      =  .11358
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0000
    Residual    .632150669    49  .012901034           R-squared     =  0.0000
       Model             0     0           .           Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F(  0,    49) =    0.00
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      50

















Sorted by:  
                                                                                                                                             
return          double %10.0g                 daily returns based on daily stock price
year            int    %10.0g                 the year of announcement date
announcement_~e int    %td..                  the announcement date of CEO turnover
price           double %td                     daily stock price
date            int    %td..                  the dates of daily stock price
company_id      byte   %10.0g                 consumer staples firms' ID
                                                                                                                                             
variable name   type   format      label      variable label
              storage  display     value
                                                                                                                                             
 size:       174,133                          
 vars:             6                          26 Aug 2012 19:21
  obs:         7,571                          
      return        7522    .0224814    1.955442         -1   169.5552
                                                                      
        year        7571    2009.247    1.922615       2007       2012
announceme~e        7571    18142.24    679.0525      17178      19159
       price        7571   -21872.88    423.6191   -21914.9      14825
        date        7571    18290.29    623.3239      17086      19200
  company_id        7571    22.40087    15.29247          1         50
                                                                      





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Abnormal Return 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.7286805   .7311215    -1.00   0.324    -2.197924    .7405632
                                                                              
cumulative~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1309.61985    49  26.7269358           Root MSE      =  5.1698
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0000
    Residual    1309.61985    49  26.7269358           R-squared     =  0.0000
       Model             0     0           .           Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F(  0,    49) =    0.00
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      50




50 IT firms and their announcement dates of CEO changes 
 
company announcement date
1 Computer Sciences Corp. (CSC)
2 IntraLinks Holdings Inc. (IL )
3 Rovi Corp.(ROVI)
4 Qlogic Corp. (QLGC)
5 USA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
6 Rogers Corp. (ROG)
7 Itron  Inc.(ITRI)
8 Mobile Messaging Solutions (MMS)
9 Verisign Inc.(VRSN-Q)
10 MTS Systems Corp. (MTSC)
11 Apple Inc. (AAPL)
12 Mace Security International, Inc.(MACE)
13 Aviat Networks Inc. (AVNW)
14 SMTC Corp. (SMX-T)
15 Genpact Limt. (G)
16 Cavitation Technologies, Inc. (Cti)
17 Yahoo! Inc. (YHOO)
18 Ditech Networks Inc.
19 Spark Networks Inc. (LOV)
20 Aware Inc. (AWRE)
21 Pulse Electronics Corp. (PULS)
22 Cinedigm Digital Cinema Corp.
23 Onvia Inc. (ONVI)
24 FormFactor, Inc.
25 EDGAR Online Inc. (EDGR)
26 FalconStor Software Inc.
27 AuthenTec (AUTH)
28 Sunovia Energy Technologies (SUNV)
29 Echelon Corp.
30 Cascade Microtech (CSCD) 
31 Glowpoint Inc.
32 LoJack Corp. (LOJN)
33 Imation Corp. 
34 SoundBite Communications, Inc. (SDBT)
35 GlideTV,Inc.
36 Blue Coat Systems, Inc. (BCSI)
37  GraphOn Corporation
38  Victory Energy Corporation
39  LoopNet, Inc.
40 Cymer, Inc. 
41 ADTRAN(R), Inc.
42 Sourcefire, Inc.
43 PMC-Sierra, Inc. (Nasdaq:PMCS) 
44 j2 Global Communications,Inc.
45 OSI Systems, Inc. (NASDAQ:OSIS)
46  Cavium Networks INC
47 Comverse Technology, Inc. (Nasdaq:CMVT)
48  Pegasystems Inc.
49 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) (NYSE: SAI)
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1  Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Feb., 06,2012
2  PepsiCo Sep.19,2011
3 Kraft Foods Inc (NYSE: KFT) April13,2010
4  MasterCard Foundation April02,2008
5 Colgate-Palmolive Company July02,2007
6  Estee Lauder Cos. Nov.08,2007
7 Archer Daniels Midland Company (NYSE: ADM) Feb.06,2007
8 SYSCO Corporation Feb.19,2008
9 Hershey Foods June15,2011
10 Mead Johnson Nutrition Company (NYSE: MJN) June15,2012
11 Plug Power Inc. (Nasdaq:PLUG) July21,2011
12 Fortune Industries, Inc. (NYSE Amex: FFI) Jan.18,2010
13 Campbell Soup Co. Jun.23,2011
14 Nautilus, Inc. (NYSE: NLS) May26,2011
15 Prestige Brands Holdings, Inc. (NYSE:PBH) Jan.12,2007
16 Bunge Limited Feb.25,2011
17 J.M. Smucker Company (NYSE:SJM) Mar.08,2011
18 McCormick & Company, Incorporated (NYSE:MKC) Oct.01,2007
19 Church & Dwight Co., Inc. (NYSE:CHD) May03,2007
20 Gentium S.p.A. (Nasdaq: GENT) Nov.09,2009
21  Molson Coors Brewing Company June10,2008
22 Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. (NYSE: HOT) Aug.31,2007
23 Avon Products, Inc. (NYSE: AVP) Apr.09,2012
24  Tyson Foods Nov.19,2009
25  Constellation Brands, Inc. June29,2007
26 Jamba, Inc. (NASDAQ:JMBA; NASDAQ:JMBAU; NASDAQ:JMBAW) Nov.17,2008
27 Ralcorp Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: RAH) Sep.26,2011
28 Cyanotech Corporation (Nasdaq: CYAN) May19,2008
29 Farmer Bros. Co. (Nasdaq: FARM) March13,2012
30  PriceSmart, Inc.  July 12, 2010
31  Spectrum Brands Apr.15,2010
32 Weis Markets (NYSE: WMK) Jan.29,2009
33 SUPERVALU INC. (NYSE: SVU) May12,2011
34 Rite Aid Corporation (NYSE: RAD) Jan.21,2010
35 Universal Corporation (NYSE: UVV) Aug.07,2007
36 Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. (NASDAQ/NM:CALM) Oct.15,2010
37 Revlon, Inc. (NYSE: REV) Apr.29,2009
38 Central Garden & Pet Company (NASDAQ:CENT) (NASDAQ:CENTA), Apr.18,2011
39  Schiff Nutrition International,Inc. Feb.25,2011
40 Spartan Stores, Inc., (Nasdaq:SPTN) Oct.15,2008
41 Diamond Foods, Inc. (Nasdaq:DMND) May07,2012
42 Pantry Inc. Feb.15,2012
43 Medifast, Inc. (NYSE: MED) Feb.02,2012 
44 LifeVantage Corporation, Mar.15,2011
45  Armanino Foods Feb.13,2009
46  Z Trim Holdings, Inc. Aug21,2007
47 Health Enhancement Products In (HEPI US) Sep.08,2009
48  Fuse Science Inc. Mar.13,2012
49 Pizza Inn Holdings, Inc. June06,2012
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